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WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS ABOUT FEIST? THE
SKY IS NOT FALLING ON THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF ONLINE DATABASE
PROPRIETORS*
Paul T. Sheils** and Robert Penchina***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Justice Sandra Day O'Connor opined that the white
pages of Rural Telephone Service Company's phone directories were
"devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity," 1 commentators have
claimed2 that the sky is falling on the intellectual property rights of
proprietors of online databases.' One author warned proprietors of online databases that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.4
may have set the stage for a veritable "gold rush" of information reorganization, reconstruction and redistribution by persons other than those
who have collected and compiled the information in the first instance
. . .[and] may result in the creation of an "information aftermarket" in

which the information in lawfully acquired compilations is reworked and
sold by the acquirers to third parties.5
This article asserts that the sky has not fallen on the intellectual
property rights of proprietors of online databases. We will show that
reports of the demise of copyright protection for online databases are

* This article reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of
Dow Jones & Company, Inc. or Rogers & Wells. The authors wish to thank Sandra Johnson for
her valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
** Mr. Sheils is Associate General Counsel of Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Princeton,
New Jersey. B.A., Williams College, 1976; J.D., Fordham Law School, 1980.
*** Mr. Penchina is an Associate at Roger & Wells, New York, New York. B.A., Queens
College, 1985; J.D. New York University School of Law, 1988.
1. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Ill S. Ct. 1282, 1296 (interim ed. 1991).
2. See, e.g., Henry Beck, Copyright Protection for Compilations and Databases After
Feist, 8 COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 2 (1991); Supreme Court Copyright Ruling Could Mean Trouble
for Exchanges, Data Vendors, INSIDE MARKET DATA, April 15, 1991, at 7; Wade Lambert, Yellow Pages Reuse Is Found Not to Violate Copyright, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. September
24, 1991, at BI; Baila H. Celedonia, 'Feist v. Rural Telephone'. Is the Sky Falling For Directory
Publishers?, N.Y.L.J., April 12, 1991, at 1.
3. For purposes of this article, an "online database" means an electronic information
database accessible by licensed subscribers via public or dedicated telecommunications networks
using a remote personal computer equipped with a modem.
4. 111 S. Ct. 1282.
5. Beck, supra note 2, at 2.
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greatly exaggerated, that properly drafted license agreements for online
database services provide proprietors with enforceable remedies against
unauthorized copying of database contents, and that causes of action
sounding in misappropriation and unfair competition will continue to
be effective weapons against "information aftermarket" speculators.
II.
A.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR ONLINE DATABASES AFTER

Feist

The Facts of Feist

Feist Publications, Inc. ("Feist") publishes consolidated, "areawide" telephone directories. Unlike the white pages published by the
regulated local phone companies, Feist's consolidated directories cover
multiple telephone Service areas spanning several counties. To obtain
the listings for its directory covering some fifteen counties in northwest
Kansas, Feist offered to license the lists from each of the eleven telephone companies located in the territory to be.covered by its consolidated directory. Ten of the eleven companies approached by Feist
agreed to license their lists to Feist; only one company, Rural Telephone Service Company ("Rural"), refused. Realizing that omitting
Rural's lists would leave a gaping hole in its directory, Feist decided to
use Rural's lists without its consent. After discarding several thousand
of Rural's listings that fell outside of the area to be served by Feist's
consolidated directory, Feist hired workers to confirm the accuracy of
the approximately 5,000 listings that remained. As a result of this effort, Feist's published directory included over 1,300 listings that were
identical to listings in Rural's directory, including four fictitious listings
that Rural had planted to detect copying. Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement on March 23, 1983. Eight years and three courts
later, Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, held
that "[b]ecause Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality,
Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute [copyright] infringement."'
To reach this conclusion, the Court was required to resolve the
tension between the basic principles that "facts are not copyrightable
• . . [but] compilations of facts generally are."' The Court explained
the "seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual compilations"
by resorting to the "constitutionally mandated" requirement that a
work be original to its author in order to qualify for copyright protection. 8 Facts "do not owe their origin to an act of authorship," but are
merely "discovered"; 9 thus "[i]n no event may copyright extend to the
6. 111 S. Ct. at 1297.
7. Id. at 1287.
8. Id. at 1288.
9. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
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facts themselves.""0 In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected
what had come to be known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine."
Under this doctrine, "copyright was a reward for the hard work that
went into compiling facts"; 2 the copyright in a factual work served to
preclude a second author from utilizing facts compiled by the first author unless the second author independently derived the same facts.13
In contrast to its treatment of "raw facts," the Court confirmed
that "[a] factual compilation is eligible for copyright [protection] if it
features an original selection or arrangement of facts." 4 The Court
stressed that it is only "the particular selection or arrangement," how15
ever, and not the underlying facts, that is protected by copyright.
Not all selections or arrangements of facts qualify for copyright
protection. Rather, "the facts must be selected, coordinated, or arranged 'in such way' as to render the work as a whole original."'6 The
17
originality requirement, however, "is not particularly stringent":
A compiler may settle upon a selection or arrangement that others have
used; novelty is not required. Originality requires only that the author
make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e., without copying
that selection or arrangement from another work), and that it display
some minimal level of creativity. Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test . .

.18

Applying this test to white pages listings, the Court held that
neither the selection nor the arrangement of the compiled facts was

10. Id. at 1290.
11. Id. at 1291-92.
12. Id. at 1291.
13. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990),
vacated following Feist, Ill S. Ct. 1408 (1991). The holding of Feist appears to break little new
ground in that the majority of circuits previously had rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine.
Nevertheless, Feist may present an opportunity for lower courts to reevaluate the protections afforded to factual works. An example of this is the Eleventh Circuit's use of Feist in Cable News
Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (11 th Cir. 1991) ("CNN").
CNN, which considered whether an injunction barring the copying of any present or future CNN
broadcast was an appropriate remedy for the claimed infringement of a single 30-minute broadcast segment, arguably did not implicate Feist. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit, among other
things, noted that "[a]fter Feist, it cannot be assumed that every newscast would qualify for even
compilation copyright status. Indeed Feist places such a conclusion in serious doubt." Id. at 1485
n.23. This dicta, however, finds no support in Feist. In view of the reasonable application other
courts have made of Feist, CNN stands out as a single, badly reasoned case rather than as a
harbinger of other courts' treatment of Feist. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee's
Petition for Rehearing at 11-12, Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am.,
Inc., 940 F.2d 1471 (lth Cir. 1991) (No. 90-8798).
14. Feist, Ill S. Ct. at 1290.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1294 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
Published18.by Id.
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sufficiently original to merit copyright protection. The Court observed
that the compiler/telephone company "simply takes the data provided
by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically." 19 No original selection
took place because only "the most basic information-name, town, and
telephone number-about each person who applies to it for telephone
service" is compiled." The Court also noted that the compiled facts
may not have been "selected," but rather, dictated by state law."
Moreover, the Court found that the arrangement of these
facts-merely listing subscribers in alphabetical order-was an "ageold practice . . . that utterly lacks originality." 22 Accordingly, Rural's
white pages listings were not entitled to copyright protection.
B.

Copyrightability of Factual Compilations After Feist

Consistent with Feist's advice that it is only "a narrow category of
works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking," '2 3 four of the five
post-Feist cases which have addressed factual compilations have found
the compilation at issue to be copyrightable. In Bellsouth Advertising
& Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc.,24 the
Eleventh Circuit held that a yellow pages directory was "sufficiently
distinct from the 'white pages' phone directory involved in Feist to
meet the minimal level of independent creativity required to qualify as
original." 25 The Eleventh Circuit found that the yellow pages compiler
"performed several acts of selection[,] . . . [including] select[ing]
and
demark[ing] the geographic boundaries that correspond to the scope of
each directory; . . . select[ing] a directory close date on which no more
listing modifications would be reflected; . . . [and] creat[ing] or select[ing] numerous business classifications. ' 2 In* addition, the court
noted that the various listings were coordinated and arranged "according to various categories. '2 7 The Eleventh Circuit found these seemingly uninspired acts of selection and arrangement to satisfy the requirement of originality as defined by Feist.
Similarly, in Key Publications,Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,Inc. 28 the Second Circuit found yellow pages directory
listings to evince sufficient original selection and arrangement to war-

19. Id. at 1296.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1296-97 (Rural was required to publish the white pages pursuant to state law).
22. Id. at 1297.
23. Id. at 1294.
24. 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
25. Id. at 958.
26. Id. at 957.
27. Id. at 958.
28. 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1122 (2d Cir. 1991).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
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rant copyright protection. The Second Circuit explained that
"[s]election implies the exercise of judgment in choosing which facts
from a given body . . . to include in a compilation." 29 The court held
that the compiler's selection of listings was original because the compiler "had to select from a multitude of businesses in New York and
0
elsewhere those of the greatest interest to her audience." 3 The court
further found that the arrangement of the listings was original because
it involved "creativity on the part of [the compiler] in deciding which
categories to include and under what name. ' 31
In Kregos v. The Associated Press,2 the Second Circuit evaluated
a "baseball pitching form" which listed nine items of information concerning a pitcher's past performance. The district court had granted
summary judgment dismissing the compiler's copyright infringement
33
claim on the ground that the form was insufficiently original. The
Second Circuit noted that "there are at least scores of available statistics about pitching performance . . . and therefore thousands of combinations of data that a selector can choose to include in a pitching
' The Second Circuit stated that "[i]t cannot be said as a matform." 34
ter of law that in selecting the nine items for his pitching form out of
the universe of available data, [the compiler] has failed to display
3 5 The court
enough selectivity to satisfy the requirement of originality.
remanded the case for trial. It is noteworthy that while the court found
that the selection of facts could support a copyright, it found that the
arrangement of the statistics in columns lacked the requisite creativity.36 Thus, Kregos confirmed that either an original selection or arrangement of facts may support a copyright.
Finally, in United States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited
of Durham, Inc.,37 the Fourth Circuit found that a guide which listed
various state tariffs applicable to the payphone industry in a "singlepage-per-state format" was a "sufficiently subjective and original" se8
lection and arrangement to qualify for copyright protection. This decision was based, in large part, on the Fourth Circuit's understanding
39
that the guide "could have been organized in many different ways."

29. Id. at 1124.
30. Id. at 1125.
31. id.
32. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
33. Id. at 702.
34. Id. at 704.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 709.
37. 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir. 1991).
38. Id. at 2050.
Published39.by eCommons,
1991
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Victor Lalli Enterprises, Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc.,'0 is the only
post-Feist case located as of this writing in which a factual work was
held to lack the originality required to qualify for copyright protection
as a compilation. At issue were "lucky number for the day" charts used
in connection with gambling."1 Each day's number was derived from
published racetrack statistics pursuant to a set formula. 2 The compilation for which protection was sought consisted of a chart which displayed the numbers "for periods of thirteen months, showing the
months of the year in a row across the top of the chart and the numbers 1 to 31 in a vertical column to indicate the day of the month.' 3
Numerous competing compilers published identical charts. The Second
Circuit found that the chart was "arrange[d] . . . according to 'purely
functional grids that offer no opportunity for variation.' "" Moreover,
the Second Circuit found that because the "format of the chart is a
convention . . . [the compiler] exercise[d] neither selectivity in what
he reports nor creativity in how he reports it."' 5 Accordingly, the court
found that charts were not entitled to copyright protection.
C. Infringement of Factual Compilations
Although Feist admonished that "copyright in a factual compilation is thin,""' only one of the four post-Feist cases which dealt with a
copyrightable compilation has found that the compilation was not infringed.4 7 Two post-Feist cases found that factual compilations were, in
fact, infringed.' 8 The fourth case was remanded for trial."
In Bellsouth Advertising, the Eleventh Circuit found that a yellow
page directory, and the intermediate steps taken in preparation of that
directory, infringed the copyright in a prior directory.5 0 The second
publisher had obtained a copy of the first directory and "key[ed] into a
computer database the name, address, telephone number, the classified
heading code, the advertising code and the directory code for every

40. 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
41. Id. at 672.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 673.
45. Id.
46. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 11l S. Ct. 1282, 1289 (interim ed.
1991).
47. See Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1122 (2d Cir. 1991).
48. See Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 933
F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991); United States Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham,
Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir. 1991).
49. See Kregos v. The Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
50. 933 F.2d at 958.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
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business listing" in the first directory.5 1 The various codes which were
keyed in enabled the second publisher to reconstruct the first directory.
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the second publisher was entitled to utilize the information which it could have extracted from the
first directory. By copying the directory, however, the second publisher
also appropriated the "inherent organizational elements" embodied in
the first directory and thereby infringed the copyright in that
directory."
In contrast, the Second Circuit found that a subsequent publisher's
utilization of a prior yellow page directory did not constitute copyright
infringement. 3 The court found that the "key issue" in determining
whether an infringement had occurred was "whether the organizing
principle guiding the selection of businesses for the two publications is
in fact substantially similar."' Because the first directory was organized into over 260 categories and the second organized into 28 categories, only 3 of which duplicated categories in the first directory, the
Second Circuit found that the "organizing principles of the two directories [were] not substantially similar."' 55 Thus, even though the second
publication "may have copied the names and addresses it selected"
from the prior directory, the copyright in the prior-directory was not
infringed. 56
The different outcomes in Bellsouth Advertising and Key Publications may be reconciled by noting that the second compiler in Key Publications never actually copied the directory upon which she relied as a
source of information, but merely copied the information. In contrast,
the second compiler in Bellsouth Advertising did copy the entire prior
work. This difference is significant in that the actual copying of a compilation, even if done as an intermediate step to facilitate the use of
information, of necessity duplicates the protected selection and arrangement of the compilation as well as the unprotected facts which
are embodied therein. 7 Reading these cases together, it appears that
copyright law alone does not prohibit users of online databases from

51. Id.
52. Id. at 956. See also United States Payphone, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2051 (subsequent compiler's copying of pages containing state tariffs constituted an infringement even though
compiler was free to use information contained in prior work).
53. Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., Inc. 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1122, 1124 (2d Cir. 1991).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (software program which enabled user to analyze information compiled in database infringed copyright because
Published
by eCommons,
1991 by the program to analyze it.").
... must be copied
t]he data

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

"17:2

freely utilizing the raw factual data gleaned from a computer screen, as
long as the resulting use does not incorporate the selection and arrangement employed by the database proprietor.58 Downloading a database,
however, creates a copy which embodies both the unprotected facts in,
and the protected arrangement and selection of, the database.5 9 Accordingly, even after Feist, the unauthorized downloading of a database
would appear to infringe the copyright in that database.
Indeed, the highly influential National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") has also concluded
that unauthorized copying of substantial portions of an online database
would constitute a copyright infringement.6 0 In its Final Report to
President Carter and Congress on July 31, 1978, after over two years
of studying how copyrights could be extended to new technologies, including online databases, CONTU specifically addressed the issue of
copyrightability of online databases:
There is little doubt that one who obtained access to a copyrighted
data base by normal commercial methods-paying the proprietor or the
proprietor's authorized agent for the right to search the data base and
retrieve from it information or data responsive to the search request-would infringe an existing copyright by retrieving the entire data
base and marketing an exact duplicate in competition with the copyright
proprietor. Such activity beyond question would be unauthorized copying
in violation of a valid copyright ...
.. .[C]opyright in a dynamic data base protects no individual datum, but only the systematized form in which the data are presented.
58. This is not to say, however, that database license agreements and tort based theories of
misappropriation and unfair competition cannot prohibit such unfettered use of factual data. See
discussion infra Parts IIIand IV.
59. See, e.g., Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Publishing, Inc.
933 F.2d 952, 958 (1ltlh Cir. 1991) (entering a work into a computer and storing to tape creates a
copy of the work); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982) (placing work
in "memory devices" of computer "satisf[ies] the statutory requirement of a 'copy' in which the
work is 'fixed.' "); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 at
8-104.1 (1991). It is "clear that the input of a work into a computer results in the making of a
copy, and hence that such unauthorized input infringes the copyright owner's reproduction right."
Id.
60. In 1974, Congress established CONTU to, among other things, study and report on
issues concerning copyright protection for works used in conjunction with computers. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 201-208 (1988). CONTU delivered its Final Report on July 31, 1978. See Final Report of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU Final Report"). Congress responded to the CONTU Final Report by enacting the 1980 Computer
Software Copyright Act which amended sections of the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
117 (1988). "Because Congress adopted the recommendations of the majority of CONTU virtually unchanged, courts look to the CONTU final report as the legislative history of provisions
recommended by CONTU." Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 746 F.
Supp. 520, 532 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
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The use of one item retrieved from such a work-be it an address, a
chemical formula, or a citation to an article-would not under reasonable circumstances merit the attention of the copyright proprietor. Nor
would it conceivably constitute infringement of copyright. The retrieval
and reduplication of any substantial portion of a data base, whether or
not the individual data are in the public domain, would likely constitute
a duplication of the copyrighted element of a data base and would be an
infringement. In any event, the issue of how much is enough to constitute
a copyright violation would likely entail analysis on a case-by-case basis
with considerations of fair use bearing on whether the unauthorized copying of a limited portion of a data base would be held noninfringing.
Fair use should have very limited force when an unauthorized copy of a
data base is made for primarily commercial use ...
It appears that adequate legal protection for proprietary rights in
extracts from data bases exists under traditional copyright principles as
expressed in the new law, supplemented by still-available relief under
common-law principles of unfair competition. The unauthorized taking
of substantialsegments of a copyrighted data base should be considered
infringing, consistent with the case law developed from infringement of
copyright in various forms of directories. In addition, common-law principles of misappropriation which, according to the legislative reports accompanying the new law, are not preempted with regard to computer
6
data bases are available to enforce proprietary rights in these works. '
Thus, contrary to reports of its demise, copyright remains a vibrant source of protection for proprietors of online databases. Feist
should not be read to declare open hunting season on online databases;
infringers should proceed at their peril.

III.

CONTRACTUAL PROTECTION OF ONLINE DATABASES

Feist placed no limitations whatsoever on a database proprietor's
ability to protect information contractually. The thrust of'Feist is that
"copyright is not a tool by which a compilation author may keep others
from using the facts or data he or she has collected." 6 2 Indeed, Feist
strongly suggests that other branches of the law may provide such a
63
tool.

61. CONTU Final Report at 41-42 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See discussion of
misappropriation and unfair competition infra Part IV.
62. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., IIl S. Ct. 1282, 1295 (interim ed.
1991) (emphasis added).
63.

Id. at 1292 (stating that protection may be available "under a theory of unfair

Published
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License Agreements for Online Databases

None of the major online database services6 4 relies exclusively on
copyright to restrict use of the information in its database. Instead,
each provides access to its database only pursuant to some form of
written license agreement.15 These license agreements explicitly or implicitly grant licensees (sometimes called "users," "members," or "subscribers") a limited license to access the information contained in the
database under the express terms and conditions of the license agreement. The license agreements typically contain provisions which specify
that the licensor retains title to the information contained in the
database; restrict the use of the information, including prohibitionson
the copying, redistribution and republication of the information; and
disclaim warranties and limit liabilities of the licensor resulting from
errors and omissions in the information or from delays or interruptions
in its delivery.6"
Typically, these license agreements are non-negotiable, pre-printed
forms offered to potential licensees on a "take it or leave it" basis, and,
as such, are "contracts of adhesion" under classical contract analysis."a

64. Some of the major online databases include CompuServe, a service of CompuServe,
Inc.; DataTimes, a service of DataTimes Corporation; DIALOG, a service of Knight-Ridder, Inc.;
Dow Jones News/Retrieval, a service of Dow Jones & Company, Inc.; GEnie, a service of GE
Information Services; Lexis/Nexis, a service of Mead Data Central, Inc.; Prodigy, a service of
Prodigy Services Company; and WESTLA W, a service of West Publishing Co.
65. See, e.g., Prodigy Service Member Agreement, DIALOG Standard Service Agreement
and LEXIS/NEXIS Subscription Agreement, reprinted in P. MARX, CONTRACTS IN THE INFORMATION INDUSTRY 11 125, 181, 205 (1990).
66. See, e.g., LEXIS/NEXIS Subscription Agreement 1.2, MARX, supra note 65, at 205
("All right, title and interest in the Services [electronic information services of Mead Data Central (MDC) and third parties] and the materials included therein belong to MDC, except to the
extent that third parties whose materials are made available in the Services possess copyright or
proprietary interests in such materials."); CompuServe Information Service Operating Rules
("The copying, reproduction, or publication of any part of the Service is prohibited, unless expressly authorized by CompuServe."); DIALOG Standard Service Agreement P 9, reprinted in
MARX, supra note 65, at 185. "DIALOG AND ITS SUPPLIERS MAKE NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE
WARRANTIES
OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR
MERCHANTABILITY, NOR ARE ANY SUCH WARRANTIES TO BE IMPLIED WITH
RESPECT TO THE DATA OR DATA SERVICES FURNISHED. DIALOG AND ITS SUPPLIERS ASSUME NO RESPONSIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE CUSTOMER OR
ITS EMPLOYEES, CLIENTS OR CUSTOMERS USE THEREOF. DIALOG AND ITS SUPPLIERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY THEREOF, NOR SHALL THEY BE
LIABLE FOR EXEMPLARY OR 'LOST PROFITS.' IN NO EVENT SHALL DIALOG OR
ITS SUPPLIERS LIABILITY TO CUSTOMER FOR DAMAGES, REGARDLESS OF
CAUSE OR FORM OF ACTION EXCEED THE VALUE OF THE ORDER FOR ONE (1)
YEAR PRECEDING THE INCIDENT GIVING RISE TO SUCH DAMAGES." Id.
67. An adhesion contract "is a handy shorthand descriptive of standard form printed contracts prepared by one party and submitted to the other on a 'take it or leave it' basis." Standard
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
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Certain of the highly specialized online databases6" require potential
licensees to sign and return the license agreement before they are given
passwords or other means of accessing the database. On the other
hand, the license agreements of most of the large consumer-oriented
database suppliers are not signed.6 9 Instead, they purport to bind licensees by action, not signature: conspicuous bold-faced notices warn potential licensees that accessing the database indicates acceptance by the
licensee of the terms and conditions in the license agreement.7" In this
way, these "bound-by-use" license agreements are (albeit with some
very important differences) the online database equivalent of "shrinkwrap licenses" that accompany mass-marketed computer software
programs.7 1
1. Contracts of Adhesion
"[Clontracts of adhesion, like negotiated contracts, are prima facie enforceable as written."72 Indeed, "finding a contract to be of adhe-

Oil Co. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965). "A contract which is a mass standardized form is always a contract of adhesion, because it cannot be negotiated about." 3 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559C, at 335 (1991). For a seven-part definition of "adhesion contracts" see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983). In many instances, however, online database license agreements are subject to extensive, even spirited, negotiation by the parties. Under these circumstances, the agreement would not be an adhesion contract, and its terms would be subject to
traditional principles of contract construction.
68. See, e.g., DIALOG Standard Service Agreement, MARX, supra note 65, at 182; Duns'
Marketing Service, Inc. Services Agreement, MARX, supra note 65, at 153; LEXIS/NEXIS Subscription Agreement, MARX, supra note 65, at 205.
69. Neither CompuServe, Dow Jones News/Retrieval, GEnie nor Prodigy require the licensee to sign and return a copy of the license agreement. CompuServe, GEnie and Prodigy. however,
all have some form of online "electronic acceptance" of their license agreements. See infra note
70.
70. The Dow Jones News/Retrieval User Agreement states: "READ THIS USER
AGREEMENT BEFORE USING DOW JONES NEWS/RETRIEVAL (the "SERVICE"). BY
USING THE SERVICE, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE FOLLOWING TERMS."
In some cases, the full text of the license agreement will also appear on, or be accessible from, the
initial or "welcome" screens of a database. Potential licensees will be instructed that proceeding
through the database will be deemed an acceptance of the terms and conditions of the license
agreement, or, in some cases, will be prevented from proceeding unless the word "accept" or some
keystroke equivalent is entered. GEnie, Prodigy and CompuServe all have some version of this
electronic, online acceptance. For a discussion of the enforceability of this type of electronically
accepted license agreement, see infra note 75.
71: See infra note 75 for discussion of shrink-wrap licenses.
72. Rakoff, supra note 67, at 1176; see also 3 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 559A, at 329-330.
"Since the bulk of contracts signed in this country, if not every major Western nation, are adhesion contracts, a rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts would be completely unworkable . . . . Adhesion contracts, like other contracts, are supposed to be enforced so as to fulfill the
reasonable expectations of the parties." Id.
Adhesion contracts are, however, not without critics. Indeed, one commentator is of the view
Published
by eCommons,
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sion means nothing more than that the court must review its terms for
fairness" since "adhesion contracts are neither inherently wrong nor
automatically invalid." 7 3 The fact that such agreements may have been
signed but not read or understood,74 or indeed not signed but accepted
by conduct, 75 is no longer an impediment to enforceability. Courts have
forceable." Rakoff, supra note 67, at 1176. This view, however, is in the distinct minority, and
Professor Rakoff "admitted that his view is not yet supported by the cases, nor by prior thinkers
such as Professors Llewellyn, Kessler, Leff and Slawson." 3 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 559H, at
345.
73. 3 CORBIN, supra note 67, §§ 559C, 559H. See also Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63
Cal. App. 3d 345, 354, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). "[A] determination that a
contract is adhesive is merely the beginning and not the end of the analysis insofar as enforcement
is concerned." Id.
74. See, e.g., Rakoff supra note 67, at 1179. "There is one additional aspect . . . [that]
forms part of the popular conception of the contract of adhesion: the adhering party is in practice
unlikely to have read the standard terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have
understood them if he has read them. Virtually every scholar who has written about contracts of
adhesion has accepted the truth of this assertion, and a few empirical studies that have been done
have agreed." Id.
75. For a persuasive analysis of the enforceability of unsigned "shrink-wrap" licenses for
mass-marketed computer software, see generally Michael G. Ryan, Offers Users Can't Refuse:
Shrink-Wrap License Agreements As Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10 CARDOZo L. REV.
2106 (1989). Unsigned online database license agreements should enjoy the same presumption of
enforceability as signed ones. As long as potential licensees are adequately warned that access to
the database is subject to the terms of the license agreement, the failure to obtain a signature
should have little bearing on the enforceability analysis. "For all intents and purposes, whether the
adhering party signs a form he has not read or indicates his 'assent' by action should make no
difference. Either his signature or his action should be sufficient to satisfy the nominal assent
required to initiate a review of the adhesion contract for fairness. Indeed, the Restatement contemplates that accepting an adhesion contract by conduct should constitute assent." Id. at 2128
n.107.
Moreover, because of the nature of the marketing and billing of online databases, proponents
of online database license agreements should face fewer obstacles to enforceability than their
counterparts in the software arena. First, unlike typical computer software users, licensees. of online databases must communicate directly with the licensor's host computers each time they access
the database. This "interactive" contact permits online database suppliers to engage in an "electronic offer and acceptance" dialogue. By inserting on the initial or "welcome" screen of the
database the text of (or a reference to an online version of) the license agreement and requiring
the licensee to indicate his or her acceptance of the terms of the agreement by typing the word
"accept" (or a keyboard equivalent), the licensor can, in effect, obtain an online "signature"
indicating the licensee's acceptance of the terms of the license agreement. Second, because most computer programs are not purchased directly from the publisher, but in remote retail outlets, proponents of shrink-wrap software agreements must overcome arguments that the purchaser has no
"privity of contract" with the publisher. "This lack of privity results in claims that the purchaser
contracted with the retailer for the outright purchase of the software, thus invalidating any unilateral license agreement which divests the purchaser of title." Id. at 2127. Many online database
vendors, on the other hand, rely exclusively or primarily on direct sales to the public. Moreover,
unlike software purchases which typically involve the payment of a one-time, up-front fee to a
remote retailer, charges for database usage are billed directly to the licensee by the licensor on a
monthly basis, thereby establishing an ongoing relationship between licensor and licensee that
should effectively overcome lack of privity claims.
In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, the Third Circuit considered whether
a disclaimer of warranties which was included in a shrink-wrap license should have been incorpohttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
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been forced to depart from traditional notions of "mutual assent" in
their analysis of the enforceability of adhesion contracts. "Because
there is no basis for finding true assent to adhesion contracts, assent is
reduced to a nominal requirement in this analysis. . . . Instead of assent, fairness and commercial justification are dispositive of whether
adhesion contracts are to be enforced ....
Enforceability of Online Database License Agreements
Courts will enforce the terms of an adhesion contract if
there are
legitimate business objectives for using an adhesion contract, and if the
specific terms of the contract are narrowly tailored to achieve these
objectives. 77 One recent commentator summarized the commercial justification for the use of adhesion contracts by modern businesses:
2.

Adhesion contracts, by providing an inexpensive way to define the
legal relationship between the contracting parties, provide a valuable tool
for ordering commercial transactions. From the drafting party's viewpoint, enforcing adhesion contracts creates efficiency within the industry
since all contracts are standardized. Additionally, adhesion contracts
promote distribution of goods and services which would otherwise be restricted because of the cost of negotiating a tailored contract with each
purchaser. Adhering parties benefit from enforceability because goods
and services are available at a lower cost because of reduced transaction
costs. Adhesion contracts thus benefit both parties to the transaction and
are enforceable despite the absence of specific assent by the adhering
parties.

78

Reduction of transaction costs and standardization of contractual
arrangements are undeniably legitimate business objectives of proprie-

rated into a prior agreement between merchants for the sale of goods. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
The disclaimer was contained on packages of software that the plaintiff had purchased from the
defendant for the purpose of combining with hardware and marketing to third parties. The court
stated the "[when a disclaimer is not expressed until after the contract is formed, U.C.C. § 2-207
governs the interpretation of the contract, and, between merchants, such disclaimers, to the extent
they materially alter the parties' agreement, are not incorporated into the parties' agreement." Id.
at 105. The court found that the contract had been formed at some point prior to the plaintiff's
receipt of the shrink-wrap licenses, when the parties exchanged telephone calls, purchase orders
and invoices, and goods and money. Because the shrink-wrap disclaimer would "substantially alter" the parties' agreement, the court found that it could not become part of the agreement. Id. In
light of Step-Saver, online database proprietors should take all necessary steps to insure that
licensees are not permitted access to the database without first having been presented with a copy
of, and having accepted, the license agreement.
76. Ryan, supra note 75, at 2124-25. See 3 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 559B, at 334.
"[F]airness implies an objective inquiry, from the viewpoint of society in general, whether what
someone got was worth what it cost him." Id.
77. 3 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 559G. The authors could find no case in which the enforceability of an online database license agreement was at issue.
75, at 2132.
supra note1991
78. byRyan,
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tors of online databases." An even more important objective, however,
is the creation of an efficient, uniform mechanism for protecting the
proprietor's most valuable asset: the data in the database. 80 In light of
the ease with which information in a database can be downloaded and
redistributed, competitors unfettered by use restrictions could quickly
render the once-valuable data substantially less valuable."a In addition,
online database license agreements provide proprietors with needed
protections against potential liabilities that might otherwise overwhelm
them. Indeed, because large collections of data are bound to contain
errors or omissions, few database proprietors would be willing to risk,
much less be able to find someone to underwrite the risk of, providing
information to the public absent enforceable disclaimers of warranties
and limitations of liability such as are typically found in online
database license agreements.8"
Moreover, the specific use restrictions of online database license
agreements are narrowly tailored to achieve these legitimate business
purposes.83 A typical online database agreement provides that the data
retrieved by the licensee from the database may be "stored in memory,
manipulated, analyzed, reformatted, printed, and displayed" for the licensee's "personal, noncommercial use." 84 The use restrictions, on the

79. Prodigy alone has over one million members. See Prodigy Network Defends Display of
Anti-Semitic Notes, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 22, 1991, at BI, col. 3. Attempting to
negotiate individual agreements with that number of members would be an exercise in commercial
folly.
80. This is especially true in light of the uncertainties generated by Feist.
81. For a good discussion on the enforceability of restrictive clauses in adhesion contracts,
see 3 CORBIN. supra note 67, § 559E, at 340 ("Businesses have a right to survive.").
82. See DIALOG Service Agreement, MARX, supra note 65, at 185. Enforceability of warranty disclaimers and limitations of liability in adhesion contracts requires a lengthy analysis,
beyond the scope of this article. Cases where overreaching disclaimers and limitations have been
held unenforceable are numerous. See generally U.C.C. § 2-301 cmt. I (and cases cited therein).
The authors maintain, however, that, given the sheer volume of the information compiled by online database vendors and the difficulty of compiling and distributing such information in electronic form, the warranty disclaimers and limitations of liability in the typical online database
license agreement are fair, commercially justified and, therefore, enforceable. Online database
distributors are held to a different standard than vendors of goods; license terms tracking the
protections to which database distributors are otherwise entitled should be deemed enforceable.
See, e.g., Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987) (database "is
entitled to the same protection as more established means of news distribution," thus, proprietor
not liable for alleged negligent misrepresentation to subscriber); see also Gutter v. Dow Jones,
Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986) (newspaper publisher not liable for "negligent misrepresentation" to reader who allegedly relied on inaccurate information contained in newspaper).
83. "[A]dhesion contract terms cannot be fair unless there is some good reason for the
business to impose a particular burden on those who deal with it." 3 CORBIN, supra note 67, §
559E, at 339.
84. The quoted language is from the Dow Jones News/Retrieval User Agreement. The
CompuServe Operating Rules state: "Customers may download copyrighted material for their
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
own use." The Prodigy Service Member Agreement provides that "Members may reproduce copy-
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other hand, are specifically designed to preserve the value of the data
(and the proprietor's investment in it) by prohibiting unauthorized copying, redistribution or other commercial exploitation.8 5
Courts will also review an adhesion contract to determine whether
any of its terms are "beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary
person or are oppressive or unconscionable." 86 The terms of a typical
online database license agreement, especially those restricting use of
the data, are well within the "reasonable expectations" of the licensee.
Most licensees of online databases understand that the restrictions on
use and other provisions are necessary to protect the legitimate business
interests of the online database proprietor. Licensees are given sufficient freedom to use the information to meet their legitimate needs yet
are prohibited from using the information in ways that would diminish
the value of the proprietor's investment in the database.87 Restrictions
on use of data, including prohibitions against copying and republication
of the facts in the database, are neither oppressive nor unconscionable.
3. A Word on Copyright Misuse: Lasercomb America v. Reynolds
Some commentators have pointed to the expansion of the doctrine
of "copyright misuse" by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Lasercomb America v. Reynolds8 8 as limiting the
availability of "contractual protections for licensors of copyrightable

righted materials displayed on the Prodigy service solely for their own personal use." It should be
noted that all online database license agreements reviewed in connection with this article are preFeist versions. Online database proprietors will doubtless be reviewing the terms of these agreements in light of Feist.
85. The Dow Jones News/Retrieval User Agreement provides that the licensee shall not
"reproduce, retransmit, disseminate, sell, distribute, publish, broadcast or circulate the information received through the Service to anyone . . . without the express prior written consent of Dow
Jones." CompuServe's restriction on use is reprinted at note 66, supra.
86. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). There is
some dispute among the authorities as to whether an adhesion contract will be struck down if it is
merely unfair, or whether it must be "demonstrably unfair" or "oppressive or unconscionable."
See 3 CORBIN . supra note 67, at 332 ("Although there is considerable overlap in coverage, not all
contracts which are unfair are so grossly unfair as to be unconscionable; though it would naturally
follow that all contracts which are unconscionable are unfair. Adhesion contract analysis only
strikes down unfair adhesion contracts."). "Unconscionability" is codified but not defined in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The official comment, however, sheds some light on
the issue: "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract."
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. Since the subject matter of online database license agreements is services
rather than goods, it is unlikely that the U.C.C., which applies to transactions in goods, applies.
87. "[Flairness implies an objective inquiry, from the viewpoint of society in general,
whether what someone got was worth what it costs him." 3 CORBIN, supra note 67, § 559B, at
334.
Cir. 1990).
88. by
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works." 89 While Lasercomb did hold that certain provisions in a
software license agreement amounted to "copyright misuse," the offensive provisions are not the sort that would appear in a typical online
database license agreement. Thus, Lasercomb will not alter the enforceability analysis of standard online database license agreements.
Acknowledging that "much uncertainty engulfs the 'misuse of
copyright' defense," 9 0 the court in Lasercomb nonetheless held that the
presence of certain anticompetitive provisions in Lasercomb's standard
software license agreement for its computer assisted die making
software "amounts to misuse of its copyright."9 The offensive provisions were "extremely broad": licensees were prohibited, for the ninetynine year term of the license, from competing, directly or indirectly,
with Lasercomb in the market for computer assisted die making
software. 92 After a review of the scant case law, a the court concluded
that "[t] he misuse arises from Lasercomb's attempt to use its copyright
in a particular expression, [Lasercomb's computer assisted die making
software], to control competition in an area outside the copyright." 94
Even if this questionable extension of the copyright misuse doctrine survives scrutiny, it poses no threat to the typical online database
license agreement. We have not seen any agreements that purport to
prohibit licensees from competing against the database proprietor in
the online database market for any length of time, much less for the
ninety-nine year period at issue in Lasercomb. Rather, the primary
function of the online database license agreements is to prevent the licensee from copying and redistributing the data retrieved from the
database, a prohibition whose legitimacy was. recognized by the
Lasercomb court: "Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect
against copying of the [Lasercomb software] code." 95
Thus, license agreements, and the use restrictions contained in
them, represent the most effective means of protecting online
databases. When drafted fairly and used properly, these agreements
give online database proprietors legitimate and effective control over
the use and exploitation of their valuable asset.

89. Beck, supra note 2, at 2.
90. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 973.
,91. Id.
92. The Lasercomb license agreement stated that: "Licensee agrees during the term of this
Agreement [99 years] . . . that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or assist others in the
writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die making software." Id. at 973.
These restrictions were apparently in addition to the standard prohibitions against copying, disassembling or decompiling the Lasercomb software.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 979.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
95. Id. at 978.
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IV.

TORT-BASED PROTECTION OF DATABASES

Feist's strongly worded holding that facts may not be protected by
copyright does not mean that -facts may not be protected. Feist itself
contemplates non-copyright-based protection of facts. The Court suggests that "'[p]rotection for the fruits of . . . research [-presumably,

facts-] may in certain circumstances be available under a theory of
unfair competition.' "96 Indeed, in explaining its rejection of the "sweat
of the brow" doctrine, the Court stated that the "best example is InternationalNews Service v. The Associated Press," a case which rejected
copyright protection of facts, but which nevertheless protected facts
from misappropriation.97
A.

Sources of Unfair Competition Law

As one court recently stated, " '[u]nfair competition' includes a
broad range of claims" which are cognizable in federal and state
courts. 8 State unfair competition law includes both common law and
statutory causes of action. Foremost among the non-statutory branches
of unfair competition is the misappropriation doctrine which originated
in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press99 ("INS"). In INS,
the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction which prohibited INS from
selling, in competition with the Associated Press ("AP"), news which
INS had copied from AP. Generally, under the doctrine which
emerged from the INS case, a cause of action for misappropriation
arises when (1) a plaintiff has invested substantial time and money to
develop a "property"; (2) a defendant has appropriated the property at
little or no cost; and (3) the plaintiff has been injured by the defendant's conduct.1"'

96. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., III S. Ct. 1282, 1292 (interim ed.
1991) (quoting I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 59, § 3.04).
97. Id. Surprisingly, Feist wrongly states that "Associated Press had conceded taking news
reported by International News Service," and that the Court "rendered judgment for International News Service," Id. n.*, when it was INS who had taken the news and AP who had prevailed. 248 U.S. 215, 231 (1918).
98. Balboa Insurance Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787 (Cal. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 347 (interim ed. 1990).
99. 248 U.S. 215.
100. See, e.g., Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 467
(9th Cir. 1990); Balboa Ins., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 787. The misappropriation cause of action evolved
differently in various jurisdictions. For instance, "[a]lthough it traces its roots to INS, the New
York misappropriation tort has grown much broader. It is now a fact-oriented action providing
relief from all types of 'commercial immorality.'" Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601
F. Supp. 1523, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823, 834
(N.D. 111.1989), affd, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990). "The Supreme Court of Illinois has not
defined the tort [of misappropriation] precisely, but it appears to permit the owner of intellectual
Published
bytoeCommons,
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Preemption

In the context of the copyright law, Congress expressly set forth
those aspects of state law which were and were not preempted by the
Copyright Act of 1976.101 Section 301 declares that "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by [the Copyright Act of 1976].'"102 Thus, a state law claim-whether statutory or

common law-is preempted "if, but only if, two conditions are met: (1)
the work in which the right is asserted is fixed in a tangible form and

comes within the subject matter of copyright [as defined by 17 U.S.C.
sections 102 and 103]; and (2) [the state law created] right is
equivalent to any of the [exclusive] rights specified in [17 U.S.C. section 106]".lo0
Although "[slection 301 has been applied by various courts to preempt a wide range of actions," 104 courts have found many state unfair
competition claims to survive preemption. Read together, the cases
dealing with preemption of unfair competition claims demonstrate the
continued availability of state unfair competition law to protect online
databases. Three reasons for the continued viability of such claims can

In addition to misappropriation, many jurisdictions recognize that a breach of confidence, or
a breach of a confidential relationship, may give rise to a claim of unfair competition. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986);
Balboa Ins., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02. "Unfair competition" also encompasses claims for misappropriation of trade secrets. Finally, there "lies a host of often overlapping theories" which provide
the bases for unfair competition claims, including "breach of fiduciary duty, interference with
prospective economic advantage . . . and interference with contractual relations." Balboa Ins.,
267 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
Moreover, various states have codified aspects of the law of unfair competition. For example,
Massachusetts General Law chapter 93A, section 2(a) "makes unlawful any 'unfair or deceptive'
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
626 F. Supp. 201, 214 (D. Mass. 1986) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West
1985)). Similarly, California statutes empower "a court to enjoin unfairly competitive acts." Balboa Ins., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 787 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 & 17203 (West
1988)). Such statutes provide private causes of action for acts of unfair competition.
101. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). Generally, as the Second Circuit recently reiterated:
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause may compel invalidation of state law in several ways:
"First, Congress may in express terms declare its intention to preclude state regulation in a
given area . . . . Second, in the absence of an express declaration, preemption may be
implied when the federal law is 'sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementing state regulation. . . .' Finally, state law
may be preempted 'to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute.' "
Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 184 (interim ed. 1991).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1362 (N.D. I11. 1989);
Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See
generally, I NIMMER & NIMMER. supra note 59, § 1.01[B).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
104. Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1534.

1992]

THE FUSS ABOUT FEIST

be discerned from the cases. First, the legislative history of the Copyright Act demonstrates Congress' intent that states continue to provide
remedies for the misappropriation of "hot" news and information
stored in databases. Second, some courts have found that facts stored
in databases, as opposed to the expression of those facts, are not within
the subject matter of copyright. Finally, many unfair competition
claims include "extra elements" so that the claims are not equivalent to
any of the rights under copyright.
1. Certain Misappropriation Claims Are Not Preempted
The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 evinces Congress' intent that some state unfair competition claims survive preemption. The House Judiciary Committee Report on the 1976 Amendments to the Copyright Act states that:
"Misappropriation" is not necessarily synonymous with copyright infringement, and thus a cause of action . . . is not preempted if it is in

fact based neither on a right within the general scope of copyright . . .
nor on a right equivalent thereto. For example, state law should have the
flexibility to afford a remedy . . . against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts . . . constituting

"hot" news, whether in the traditional mold of InternationalNews Service v. The Associated Press, or in the newer form of data updates from

scientific, business, or financial data bases.'
In view of this legislative history, it is not surprising that courts have
declared that "Congress clearly intended to preserve some form of the
'
tort of misappropriation. "106
Consistent with Congress' clearly expressed intent, courts have
held that claims alleging the misappropriation of hot news are not subject to preemption. Moreover, courts have confirmed that, in accordance with congressional intent, claims alleging the misappropriation of
data from online databases likewise are not preempted.
For instance, in Nash v. CBS, Inc., the Northern District of Illinois held that "all misappropriation claims, except those similar to the
examples cited in the House Report, are preempted.' ' 7 The court ex-

105. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5748 (emphasis added).
106. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823, 834 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th
Cir. 1990); see also Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (" 'misappropriation' of 'hot' news under [INS is] a
branch of the unfair competition doctrine not preempted by the Copyright Act according to the
House Report"); Mayer, 601 F. Supp. at 1534 ("It is . . . not surprising that the House Report
considered misappropriation to survive preemption.").
Published
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plained that because the misappropriation claims at issue in Nash involved the use of ideas contained in a historical work, and did "not
involve the 'systematic' appropriation of 'hot news' or valuable stored
information," the claims were preempted.1 "8 The import of Nash, however, is its confirmation that misappropriation claims related to hot
news or valuable stored information are not preempted.
Similarly, the Southern District of New York has confirmed the
continued vitality of state claims alleging the misappropriation of hot
news or information stored in databases. In Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 0 9 the court culled from the legislative history of
the Copyright Act examples of "misappropriation claims preserved by
the statute." One "example of an unpreempted misappropriation action" set forth by the court involved the taking of hot news." 0 The
court also specified that a state misappropriation action properly would
lie when one "improperly invades another's computerized data base and
gains access to the data.""' The court explained that "these examples
involve subject matter other than copyright, specifically the facts and
data as opposed to their expression," and thus are not subject to
preemption.112
Likewise, in FinancialInformation Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service," 3' the Second Circuit recognized that a claim alleging the misappropriation of hot news "is not preempted." The court did find that the
misappropriation claim there at issue was preempted, however, because
the disputed information was "at least ten days old," and thus, no
longer "hot.""' 4 Although finding preemption, the Second Circuit was
careful to note that the claim at issue did not involve the "use of information from 'data bases' "; rather, "the material in question here was
obtained through conventional channels.""15
2.

Facts Fall Outside of the Subject Matter of Copyright

Compelling arguments can be made that facts, as opposed to their
expression, selection, or arrangement, fall outside of the subject matter

108. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
109. 601 F. Supp. at 1534.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
114. Id. The court explained that "the 'hot' news doctrine is concerned with the copying
and publication of information gathered by another before he has been able to utilize his competitive edge." Id. The plaintiff had "proved neither the quantity of copying nor the immediacy of
distribution necessary to sustain a 'hot' news claim." Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
115. Id. at 208 n.4.
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of copyright, and thus, actions sounding in misappropriation of facts
should escape the preemptive effect of section 301.
At least one court has adopted this reasoning in holding that a
claim alleging the misappropriation of facts was not preempted. In
Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc.,"' the plaintiff asserted that the defendant had misappropriated portions of a
"mileage guide" by using data which was contained therein.11 7 The
court explained that:
Use [in contrast to reproduction of the factual data,] may be clearly
outside of the subject matter of copyright. For example, a print-out of
one particular distance (as opposed to a print-out of the entire compilation) would not be within the subject matter of the [Copyright] Act, as it
is a fact[,] not a part of a compilation.11 8
Accordingly, the court held that because "use of the reproduced data
bank may be outside of the subject matter test of section 301(a), it is
outside of the scope of the preemption doctrine."1 1 9
This reasoning was echoed by the court in Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd. 12 0 As discussed above, Mayer attributed the congressional intent that database and hot news claims not be preempted
to the fact that "facts and data[,] as opposed to their expression," involve "subject matter other than copyright." ' 1 Similarly, Professor
Nimmer has posited:
[I]nsofar as [INS] applied the misappropriation doctrine to news per se,
and not to its expression, it would be immune from federal preemption.
This for the reason that the Supreme Court recognized that news per se
cannot be regarded as a 'writing'
within the meaning of the Copyright
122
Clause of the Constitution.
Feist may provide further support for the proposition that misappropriation of fact claims avoid preemption. 23 Feist made clear that

116. 591 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. II. 1983).
117. Id.at 739.
118. Id.
119. Id. Although ruling that the Copyright Act presents no bar to a claim which alleges
misappropriation by use of information, the court reserved judgment as to whether such a claim
would be barred by the First Amendment. Id.
120. 601 F. Supp. 1523.
121. Id.at 1534.
122. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 59, § 1.01[B] n.102.
123. Indeed, Feist suggests that "[p]rotection for the fruits of ...
research . . . may in
certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair competition." 1t1 S. Ct. at 1292
(quotation omitted). See also Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, Inc., 933 F. 2d 952, 957 n.1 I (11 th Cir. 1991) (post-Feist case declaring that information
"accumulated by the 'sweat of the brow'" may be "protected under the law of unfair
Published
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the Constitution precludes Congress from including raw facts within
the scope of copyright. 2 4 As Nimmer argued, if "Congress may not
legislate a copyright in facts, it likewise may not preempt the states
from enacting such legislation." 25
3. Certain Unfair Competition Claims Are Not Preempted
Pursuant to section 301, claims which encompass rights which are
not "equivalent" to rights under copyright are not subject to preemption. A state law right is equivalent if" '(1) it is infringed by the mere
act of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, or (2) it requires additional elements to make out a cause of action, but the additional elements do not differ in kind from those necessary for copyright
infringement.' "126 For instance, an unfair competition claim which
seeks to remedy harms resultant from the "unauthorized use or transfer" of software "adds nothing to a potential copyright infringement
claim," and thus is preempted.' 2 7
In contrast, breach of confidence claims are not preempted. As one
court explained, a "breach of confidence claim is nonequivalent to the
rights one can acquire under copyright law; rather it rests on an obligation not to disclose to third parties ideas revealed in confidence, which
obligation is judicially imposed only upon a party that accepts the relationship."' 2 8 Accordingly, courts routinely hold that unfair competition
claims based upon alleged breaches of confidence survive preemption.' 29 Similarly, it is beyond question that section 301 does not impair
states' abilities to provide remedies for the misappropriation of trade
secrets.'
Because of the apparent willingness of courts to entertain causes of
action based upon breaches of confidences, the law of unfair competi-

124.
125.

111 S. Ct. at 1288.
1

&

supra note 59, § 2.11 [E] n.30. The argument that fact-based
unfair competition claims are not preempted because facts fall outside the scope of copyright is
intuitively appealing. It appears, however, that the prevailing view is that "[s]tate law claims do
not avoid preemption simply because they are based upon the improper use of uncopyrightable
material contained in works properly the subject of copyright." Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp.
823, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
126. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1362 (N.D. 111.1989) (quoting Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 678 n.26 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987)).
127. Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 803 (Cal Ct. App.), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 347 (interim ed. 1990).
128. Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y.), aff d, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.
1984).
129. See, e.g., Brignoli v. Balch, Hardy & Scheinman, 645 F. Supp.1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Sargent v. American Greetings Corp., 588 F. Supp. 912, 924 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20
130. See, e.g., Brignoli, 645 F. Supp. at 1205; Balboa Ins., 267 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
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tion should continue to provide an additional layer of protection for
proprietors of databases. Inclusion of confidentiality provisions in
database licenses should provide a legitimate basis for cognizable tort
claims even in the unlikely event that INS-type misappropriation
claims are found to be preempted. t5 5
V.

CONCLUSION

Feist has clearly altered the landscape of copyright protection of
factual compilations. As we have demonstrated, however, the alarmists
who claim that this new landscape now permits strip-mining of online
databases are misguided. Not only does copyright remain a viable
source of protection for online database proprietors, but contract law
and tort law will continue to thwart those who would misappropriate
information from online databases. The sky has not fallen after all.

131. The causes of action discussed herein are aimed primarily at the improper use of data
by those who are authorized to use the data. Additional protection is available against the unauthorized entry into databases. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.4 (Michie 1986) (criminalizPublished
by eCommons,
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trespass). 1991

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/20

